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Abstract 
 
Proponents of restrictions on the wearing of religious symbols in public institutions in Quebec 
have often framed their support in the language of liberalism, with references to “gender 
equality”, “state neutrality” and “freedom of conscience”. However, efforts to account for support 
for restrictions on minority religious symbols rarely mention liberalism. In this article, we test the 
hypothesis that holding liberal values might have different attitudinal consequences in Quebec 
and the rest of Canada. Our findings demonstrate that holding liberal values is associated with 
support for restrictions on the wearing of minority religious symbols in Quebec, but opposition to 
such restrictions in the rest of Canada. Moreover, this difference in the relationship between 
liberal values and support for restrictions on minority religious symbols in Quebec and the rest of 
Canada can explain Quebecers’ greater support for restrictions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
In the Fall of 2013, the Parti Québécois government introduced the Charter of Quebec Values. 
The Charter proposed to ban public employees from wearing “overt and conspicuous” religious 
symbols. Although the legislative proposal would have banned all religious symbols –  including 
Christian ones – the public debates focused primarily on minority religious symbols, such as the 
hijab, turban or kippa. While it sparked intense debates in Quebec, opposition to the Charter was 
especially strong in the rest of Canada (Angus Reid Global, 2013), where it was denounced as 
illiberal. 
 
To explain Quebecers’ support for restrictions on minority religious symbols in the public sphere, 
commentators have stressed interpretations ranging from Quebec’s status in Canada to its fraught 
history with the Catholic Church (Iacovino, 2015; Burchardt 2016). Although many of the 
Charter’s proponents framed their support in the language of liberalism, with references to 
“gender equality”, “state neutrality” and “freedom of conscience”, efforts to account for support 
for restrictions on minority religious symbols rarely mention liberalism.1 For some 
commentators, references to liberal values by supporters of personal restrictions on minority 
religious symbols constitute “faulty rationalizations for bigotry” (Siddiqui, 2013: see also Bakali 
2015). Such doubts are not unwarranted; there is growing evidence that far-right parties in 
Europe have co-opted the language of gender equality and liberal values in order to legitimize 
anti-immigration and anti-minority positions (Betz and Meret, 2009; Mayer, 2013). 
 
Liberals, however, have often disagreed about what ought to be the role of the liberal state. Key 
to such debate has been whether it should promote, reflect or enforce liberal values, even through 
the use of “illiberal means” (Triadafilopoulos, 2011). A number of scholars have proposed 
different categories to make sense of those distinct interpretations: procedural and substantive 
liberalisms (Taylor, 1993); enlightenment and reformation liberalisms (Galston, 1995); or British 
or French liberalisms (Joppke, 2009). Implicit in these analyses is the idea that liberalism can 
have distinct policy implications, in large part because it is embedded in different contexts. From 
the point of view of public opinion, it also means that public discourse around liberalism may 
vary and might, in different settings, exert entirely different influences on public policy attitudes.  
 
In this regard, liberalism is arguably similar to other political ideologies whose specific impact 
has been shown to be context-dependent, such as patriotism, nationalism or regionalism (Billiet et 
al. 2003; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2008; Citrin, Johnston and Wright, 2012). According to Citrin, 
Johnston and Wright (2012: 532), official policy and elite discourses around the nation vary and 
since “(…) mass opinion imbibes the wine poured by dominant elites”, the impact of, for 
example, patriotism on mass publics differs across policy contexts.  
 
In this article, we test the hypothesis that holding liberal values might have different attitudinal 
consequences in Quebec and the rest of Canada, even if overall professed support for liberal 
values might not be dissimilar in those two societies. More precisely, our expectation is that 
holding liberal values is associated with support for restrictions on the wearing of minority 
religious symbols in public institutions in Quebec, but opposition to such restrictions in the rest 
of Canada. We also explore whether this difference in the relationship between liberal values and 
support for restrictions on minority religious symbols in Quebec and the rest of Canada can 
explain Quebecers’ greater support for restrictions. To test these hypotheses, we rely on a survey 
of 6,400 Canadians that we designed and that was administered in January and February 2014 as 
the debate over the Charter of Quebec Values was unfolding.  
Liberalism and Support for Restrictions on Minority Religious Symbols 
An examination of the relationship between liberalism and attitudes toward minority religious 
symbols must begin with a discussion about what it means to hold liberal values. Liberals share a 
belief in the primacy of liberty as a political value. By liberal values, then, we refer to a set of 
attitudes stressing individual freedom. Over the years, several studies have identified attitudes 
that emphasize the importance of individual freedom as constituting a distinctive and reasonably 
consistent set of values (Schwartz, 1994; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).2 However, as we outline in 
this section, there is significant disagreement amongst Liberals when it comes to the role of the 
state in the promotion or enforcement of those values.  
 
According to Sawitri Saharso  (2013: 208), “[l]iberal principles are generic and hence there is a 
range within which they can be interpreted.” For John Gray (2000: 2), liberalism has two faces. 
On one hand, “(...) it is the pursuit of an ideal form of life”. On the other hand, it is “the search 
for terms of peace among different ways of life”. Gray’s conception bears a resemblance to 
William Galston’s (1995) distinction between enlightenment and reformation liberalism. 
Enlightenment liberalism, which entails a “commitment to sustained rational examination of self, 
others, and social practices” prioritises individual autonomy (1995: 521). Reformation liberalism,  
in contrast, entails a commitment by liberal institutions to tolerance and diversity, and privileges 
individual choices, whether they are perceived to be the product of rational examination or not. 
Other scholars distinguish between French and British or “Anglo-Saxon” forms of liberalism 
(Bowen, 2006; Joppke, 2009). Echoing Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative 
liberty, Bowen argues that the difference between the French and British approaches to 
secularism is essentially Rousseau against Locke, “freedom through the state against freedom 
from the state” (Bowen, 2006: 15). What these different dichotomies underline is that liberals can 
have different visions of the role of the state in the promotion of freedom. More specifically, 
liberals on either side of this faultline can disagree as to whether the state should actively reflect, 
promote and even enforce liberal values. Different understandings of the role of the state can 
therefore vary across individuals – in that they reflect the particular interpretation of liberalism to 
which one adheres – but they can also be influenced by context. The role of the liberal state can 
be the object of intense debates amongst elites and can vary across time and space. In addition, 
one  particular perspective can become dominant over time and can become accepted by the 
wider public.  
 
Liberalism in Quebec and the Rest of Canada 
In the study of liberalism in Quebec and Canada, the literature also points to the existence of 
distinctive views of the role of the state in enforcing liberal values. In his well-known essay 
Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, Charles Taylor (1993) argues that two 
liberalisms cohabitate in Canada: one in Quebec and the other one in the rest of Canada. Whereas 
“procedural liberalism” is said to be dominant in English-speaking Canada,  a form of 
“substantive liberalism” is perceived to predominate in Quebec. Procedural liberalism is 
associated with a neutral stance by the state on what constitutes the good life, as well as with the 
precedence of individual rights. As for substantive liberalism, it is not neutral on what constitutes 
the good life and is willing to restrict some rights in order to promote collective goals. However, 
Taylor was writing in the context of debates around Quebec’s linguistic laws. While these 
different interpretations of liberalism would suggest greater openness in Quebec to state 
intervention to promote a given conception of the “good life”, it is only in recent years that liberal 
intellectuals and politicians in Quebec have proposed state regulation of individual expressions of 
religiosity.  In addition, polling in the 1990s showed no significant attitudinal difference between 
Quebec and the rest of Canada on support for wearing religious symbols.3 Two liberalisms there 
might have been, but they had failed to generate different action from successive Quebec 
governments or differences of opinion between Quebecers and other Canadians. What then, can 
explain the contrasting trajectory of Quebec and the rest of Canada in the past three decades? 
 
In Quebec, a number of scholars have argued that, either in the wake of 9/11 or due to increasing 
concern over demands for religious accommodations by religious minorities, the “renewed 
model” of French laïcité that emerged in the early 2000s in the wake of the Stasi commission4 
has become an inspiration for many Quebec intellectuals and politicians following the province’s 
accommodation crisis (Weinstock, 2007; Koussens and Amiraux, 2014). Despite the idea of a 
French variant of liberalism, when it comes to the state regulation of religion, up to the early 
1990s, France’s laicité had more in common with Locke than with Rousseau (or Voltaire), as it 
focused more on the institutional separation between church and state rather than on individual 
displays of religiosity (Baubérot, 2009; Koussens and Amiraux, 2014). In the contemporary 
period, it was only in the 1990s, in the context of debates around the headscarf, that a number of 
intellectuals and politicians began promoting a vision of liberalism (and laicité) that called on the 
state to regulate individual expressions of beliefs and in so doing serve as an agent of religious 
emancipation (Koussens and Amiraux, 2014: 67). It is this version of French laïcité that 
influenced numerous Quebec intellectuals and politicians, as shown by Pauline Marois’ 
declaration that France’s model of laïcité was an inspiration for her Charter proposal (Journet, 
2013). In Quebec, many intellectuals, politicians and social activists defended this model of 
laïcité explicitly on liberal grounds, arguing that it would preserve the neutrality of the state, or 
respect for gender equality and the rights of LGBTQ+ communities (Weinstock, 2007).   
 
In the rest of Canada, on the other hand, the 1990s saw important shifts in intellectual discourses 
around diversity, religious accommodations and the role of the state in a liberal society.  
According to Elke Winter (2011: 201-7), the second half of the 1990s saw a growing consensus 
amongst elites in Canada about the central value of multiculturalism, partly in reaction to Quebec 
nationalism. Consequently, the dominant contemporary form of liberalism in Canada as a whole 
is “liberal multiculturalism”, which, in the words of Triadafilopoulos (2011: 863), “(…) counsels 
negotiations, compromise and a willingness to accommodate groups whose religious beliefs and 
cultural practices may diverge from those of the majority.” For Triadafilopoulos, this form of 
liberalism is very much in the “reformation” strand of liberalism. In Quebec, on the other hand, 
multiculturalism remains much more contested by intellectuals and politicians alike (Cardinal, 
2017; Labelle, 2008). 
 
A central argument of this article is that these contemporary changes in elite discourses in Canada 
and Quebec are reflected in the different relationships between liberalism and citizen attitudes 
toward minority religious symbols. As explained in greater detail in the methodology section, our 
questionnaire allows us to indirectly test the presence of two interpretations of liberalism by 
exploring attitudes toward distinct policy proposals regarding restrictions on the wearing of 
religious symbols.   
 
Prejudice, Cultural Threat and Religiosity: Alternative Perspectives 
Beyond the hypothesis that liberal values have different attitudinal consequences in Quebec and 
in the rest of Canada, we also test whether distinctive effects of liberal values account for the 
differences in attitudes toward religious symbols in these two societies. Liberalism is not usually 
invoked to account for differences between Quebecers and other Canadians on such matters as 
minority religious symbols in public institutions. Instead, prejudice and other forms of out-group 
antipathy are typically cited when discussing the support of Quebecers for such restrictions 
(Winter, 2014; Bakali, 2015). Indeed, research in Europe demonstrates opposition to the place of 
minority religions in the public sphere is associated with generalized prejudice (Helbling, 2014; 
Van der Noll and Saroglou, 2015) or negative attitudes toward Muslims in particular (Saroglou et 
al., 2009; Van der Noll and Saroglou, 2015). Research suggests Quebecers (or French Canadians) 
are more likely than other Canadians to hold negative attitudes toward ethnic and racial 
minorities (Berry and Kalin, 1995; Bilodeau et al., 2012); consequently, the source of Quebecers’ 
greater opposition to minority religious symbols might well be the result of a greater degree of 
out-group antipathy.  
 
Another potential source of difference is the cultural insecurity of Quebecers. The key role played 
by feelings, discourses and narratives of cultural threat in the political life of what Daiva 
Stasiulus (2013) has referred to as the “worrier nation” has often been raised, including in the 
report of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. The question is whether cultural insecurity can 
explain Quebec’s stronger opposition to minority religious symbols. Group threat theory suggests 
it might. The original formulation of group threat theory stressed that majority groups are likely 
to view minority groups as threat to their socio-economic position (Blumer, 1958; Levine and 
Campbell, 1972). Another variant of the theory posits that threats can also be “symbolic” or 
“cultural” (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Velasco González et al., 2008). Such threats, the theory 
argues, are rooted in fears that out-groups (such as religious minorities) threaten the culture, 
values or status of the majority. In a cross-national study, Van der Noll (2010) observes that 
feelings of threat, including symbolic threats, are associated with support for a ban on the 
headscarves in public places; the same could hold true in Quebec. 
Yet another potential explanation is different degrees of religiosity in Quebec and the rest of 
Canada.  Religiosity refers to the active practice of rituals and the importance of religion in one’s 
life. According to Modood (1994: 72), the main divide over religious issues is now not between 
different religious groups, but between “(…) those who think religion has a place in a secular 
public culture and those who don’t”. A number of studies have shown that higher levels of 
religiosity are associated with greater support for the accommodation of religious minorities by 
public institutions or with more positive attitudes toward religious minorities (Clement, 2013; 
Van der Noll and Saroglou, 2015). As such, greater support for restrictions on the presence of 
religious symbols in public institutions in Quebec, including minority religious symbols, might 
be explained by the lower level of religiosity of Quebecers in comparison to other Canadians 
(Eagle, 2011; Meunier and Wilkins-Laflamme, 2011). 
 
Methodology and Data  
In order to test the hypotheses presented above, we rely on data from an online survey of 6,400 
Canadians stratified by province that we conducted in January and February 2014.5 We rely on 
indicators measuring support for restrictions on minority religious symbols in three scenarios. 
First, respondents were asked whether it is acceptable or unacceptable for a police officer on duty 
to exhibit religious symbols such as a headscarf or a turban. The Bouchard-Taylor Commission in 
Quebec recommended that public servants, such as police officers, who hold coercive powers, 
should not be allowed to exhibit any religious symbols. Respondents were also asked whether it 
is acceptable or unacceptable for teachers at a public school to exhibit minority religious 
symbols. While not a recommendation of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, the Charter of 
Quebec values proposed to extend restrictions on religious symbols to all employees of publicly-
financed institutions. The third indicator extends restrictions to students at a public school. Such 
a proposal was neither part of the recommendations of the Bouchard-Taylor commission, nor of 
the Charter of Quebec Values. It has not been the subject of either public or intellectual debates 
in recent years. These different indicators therefore vary in the extent to which they were 
embedded within elite discourses. In Quebec, elite cues on the relationship between liberalism 
and attitudes towards minority religious symbols would have been more prevalent on the issue of 
restrictions for police officers and less prevalent on restrictions for students. We are interested to 
see not only whether liberalism pushes attitudes in different directions in Quebec and the rest of 
Canada, but also whether the relationship between liberalism and support for restrictions on 
minority religious symbols depends on which groups those restrictions are imposed on.  
 
The data indicate that opinions about restrictions on minority religious symbols depend on the 
target of those restrictions, and are systematically different in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. 
Support for restrictions is strongest for police officers on duty, with 74% of Quebecers and 45% 
of other Canadians in favour of restricting minority religious symbols in this scenario. Support 
for restrictions is somewhat lower for teachers at a public school, with 59% of Quebecers and 
29% of other Canadians in favour. Support is lowest when targeted at students in public schools, 
with only 37% of Quebecers and 20% of other Canadians in favour. 
 
These frequency distributions suggest the three survey items might represent different degrees of 
difficulty with regard to the underlying concept, support for restrictions on minority religious 
symbols. That is, respondents find it easier to support restrictions on police than on teachers, and 
on teachers than on students. One possible measurement strategy, then, is to use all three items to 
construct a single Guttman or Mokken scale measuring support for restrictions on minority 
religious symbols (Van Schuur, 2003). Although  employing a single dependent variable measure 
would simplify the presentation of our empirical results, using such a scale would potentially 
miss important differences in the sources of support for restrictions on police, teachers, and 
students. Therefore, we analyze each of the three items separately. 
 
Why are Quebecers more supportive than other Canadians of restrictions on minority religious 
symbols? One possibility is that the levels of the values and attitudes associated with views on 
minority religious symbols are systematically different in these two contexts; that is, perhaps 
Quebecers are more supportive of restrictions because they are more liberal, more prejudiced, 
more culturally insecure, or less religious than other Canadians. To verify this possibility, we 
compare the values and attitudes of Quebecers and other Canadians in relation to liberal values, 
prejudice, cultural insecurity and religiosity. To measure liberal values, we use a four-item index 
where 10 means strong liberal values and 0 means weak liberal values.6 Quebecers (7.0) express 
somewhat stronger liberal values than other Canadians (6.4). To measure prejudice, we measure 
feelings toward ethnic and religious minority groups; where 10 means very positive feelings (no 
prejudice) and 0 means very negative feelings (strong prejudice). Quebecers express somewhat 
less positive feelings toward minority groups than other Canadians (6.3 vs. 6.8). We also include 
two variables measuring whether respondents have distinctive feelings toward Muslims and Jews. 
The expectation is that the relationship between prejudice and support for restrictions on minority 
religious symbols might be stronger for these two minority religious groups. These two variables 
(-10 to 10) measure the gap between feelings toward Muslims or Jews and feelings toward other 
groups; they take a positive value when feelings toward Muslims/Jews are more positive than for 
other groups, and take a negative value when feelings toward Muslims/Jews are more negative 
than for other groups. Quebecers’ feelings toward Muslims is 1.4 points lower than for other 
minority groups compared to 1.1 points lower for other Canadians. In contrast, while Quebecers 
express marginally more negative feelings toward Jews than for other minority groups (-.50), 
other Canadians express marginally more positive feelings for this group (.30). Cultural 
insecurity was measured by asking respondents whether they view immigration as a threat to the 
culture of their province. Such a perception is more widespread in Quebec than elsewhere in 
Canada (38% vs. 29%).7 Finally, to assess respondents’ religiosity, we asked them to indicate 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “religion is very important in my 
life”; 13% of Quebecers and 24% of other Canadians express a strong agreement with the 
statement.  
 
At first glance, the comparison of levels of attitudes and values between Quebecers and other 
Canadians provides little leverage for explaining differences in support for restrictions on 
minority religious symbols. Although Quebecers appear somewhat more prejudicial toward 
minority groups, more culturally insecure and less religious, the magnitude of the observed 
differences is unlikely to explain the large gap in support for restrictions on minority religious 
symbols. It is nevertheless possible that, taken altogether, the combined differences in these 
values and attitudes may explain the gap between Quebecers and other Canadians.  
 
However, another possibility is that the effects of one set of values in particular – liberal values – 
are systematically different in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. This is our central hypothesis. 
We expect that even though Quebecers and other Canadians exhibit broadly similar liberal 
values, those values tend to increase support for restrictions on minority religious symbols in 
Quebec but decrease support for restrictions in the rest of Canada. In the following section, we 
present the results of multivariate analyses designed to test both of these possibilities. 
 
Explaining the Quebec-Rest of Canada Gap  
We investigate support for each of the three scenarios for restrictions separately for two reasons. 
First, we expect that the effect of liberal values on support for restrictions in Quebec depends on 
the target of those restrictions. Second, given that support for restrictions varies widely across 
scenarios, many other correlates of support might also be different across the scenarios.  
We have tested three binary logistic regression models for each scenario. The dependent 
variables indicate whether respondents find it unacceptable (1) or acceptable (0) for a person to 
display minority religious symbols. Model I includes only provincial dummies to verify whether 
other provinces stand out in terms of support for restriction on minority religious symbols; 
Ontario is the reference category. Model II verifies whether differences in levels of attitudes and 
values explain the gap between Quebecers and other Canadians. Our expectation is that 
controlling for these attitudes and values will not account for the gap. Model III turns to our main 
hypothesis, namely that liberal values are associated with support for restrictions on minority 
religious symbols both in Quebec and the rest of Canada. In Quebec, liberal values would be 
associated with greater support for restrictions on minority religious symbols. In the rest of 
Canada, liberal values would be associated with weaker support for such restrictions. It is this 
difference that would explain the Quebec-rest of Canada gap. In order to empirically test this 
possibility, Model III examines whether the relationship between liberal values and support for 
restrictions on minority religious symbols goes in opposite directions in Quebec and in the rest of 
Canada, and whether it effectively explains the Quebec-rest of Canada gap. To that end, we 
include an interaction variable for liberal values in Quebec.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The results for all three sets of models are reported in Table 1. Model I confirms that Quebecers 
are more supportive of restrictions on minority religious symbols than other Canadians.8 It also 
indicates that New Brunswick is the only other province where support for restrictions is 
significantly stronger for all three proposed scenarios, with differences of 11 points for police 
officers, 13 points for teachers, and 8 points for students.9 Model II indicates that support for 
restrictions on minority religious symbols is indeed related to levels of religiosity and prejudice 
toward ethnic and religious minority groups; the more religious Canadians are, and the more 
positive their views of ethnic and religious minorities, the less inclined they are to support 
restrictions on minority religious symbols. Similarly, the analyses indicate that those who dislike 
Muslims more than other groups are even more supportive of restrictions on minority religious 
symbols. These relationships hold under all three scenarios for restrictions. Cultural insecurity is 
also a significant correlate of support for restrictions: those who see immigrants as a cultural 
threat are more supportive of restrictions for police officers, teachers and students. Finally, the 
analyses indicate that the stronger liberal values of Canadians are, the less supportive they are of 
restrictions on minority religious symbols. The relationship, however, is statistically significant 
only under the scenarios involving police officers and students, and in both cases the relationship 
is modest in strength. Most importantly, despite being significantly related to restrictions on 
minority religious symbols, these values and attitudes – prejudice, religiosity, cultural insecurity, 
and liberal values – do little to explain the gap between Quebecers and other Canadians. The 
coefficients measuring the greater support among Quebecers remain positive and significant in 
Model II. 
 
Model III tests our main hypothesis concerning the different impact of liberal values in Quebec 
and in the rest of Canada. We have two sets of expectations. First, if liberal values have different 
attidudinal consequences in Quebec than in the rest of Canada– then when we introduce an 
interaction variable to assess the conditional effects of liberal values in Quebec, the coefficient 
should be significant and positive (that is, the effect should be in the direction opposite that of the 
rest of Canada). Second, if the different impact of liberalism explains the gap in support for 
restrictions on minority religious symbols between Quebec and the rest of Canada, then the 
coefficient for the “Quebec” dummy variable should be effectively reduced to zero when the 
interaction variable is included in the analysis. 
 
The results in Model III are clearly consistent with the first set of expectations. Under all three 
scenarios, the coefficient for liberal values, which now represents the estimated conditional effect 
of liberal values for Canadians outside of Quebec, is negative and statistically significant (-.09 for 
police officers; -.09 for teachers; and -.10 for students).10 Moreover, the interaction term for the 
estimated effect of liberal values in Quebec is statistically significant and positive.11 The 
differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada are illustrated in Figure 1, which reports 
predicted probabilities for the net effect of liberal values in Quebec and in the rest of Canada 
under each of the three scenarios. To calculate these probabilities, we translated the log-odds 
derived from the binomial logit results into predicted probabilities in which we vary the value of 
liberal values (for Quebec and for the rest of Canada) while keeping all other independent 
variables constant at their means. The results show the divergent effects of liberal values in 
Quebec and the rest of Canada under both the police officers and teachers scenarios: in Quebec, 
the stronger respondents’ liberal values, the more likely they are to support restrictions for police 
officers and teachers. Our estimates suggest that Quebeckers with liberal values one standard 
deviation above the sample mean for liberal values are 13 percent and 18 percent more likely 
than those with liberal values one standard deviation below the mean to support restrictions for 
police officers and teachers, respectively (p < .05 for both differences). In the rest of Canada, the 
stronger respondents’ liberal values, the less likely they are to support such restrictions: those 
with liberal values one standard deviation above the sample mean for liberal values are an 
estimated to be 11 percent and 9 percent less likely than those with liberal values one standard 
deviation below the mean to support restrictions for police officers and teachers, respectively (p < 
.05 for both differences). The situation is different, however, when it comes to restrictions on 
students at public schools. Under that scenario, whereas the net effect of liberal values on support 
for restrictions is negative in the rest of Canada, there is no discernible effect in Quebec.  
  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Our results, which show divergent effects of liberal values on support for restrictions on minority 
religious symbols, explain the differences in aggregate opinions between Quebec and the rest of 
Canada. Were it not for the effects of liberal values, Quebecers would be no more supportive of 
restrictions than are other Canadians. This is best illustrated in Figure 1: when liberal values are 
absent (that is, the value for that variable is set to zero), Quebecers are, if anything, slightly less 
supportive of restrictions on minority religious symbols than are other Canadians (though the 
difference is not statistically significant). Hence, the analyses suggest that if the distinct impact of 
liberalism in both societies had no effect at all, Quebecers and other Canadians would support 
restrictions on minority religious symbols in roughly equal numbers.12  
 
Language and Support for Restrictions on Minority Religious Symbols   
The above findings suggest a cultural cleavage between Quebec and the rest of Canada. What 
role, if any, does language play in these findings? Is it possible that the liberalism cleavage 
between Quebec and the rest of Canada masks a linguistic divide between Francophones and 
other Canadians across the country? Table 1 indicated that New Brunswick is the only other 
province where support for restrictions on minority religious symbols is stronger than in the 
reference category (in this case Ontario), suggesting language may well be a salient 
consideration; New Brunswick is, after all, the province with the largest proportion of 
Francophones after Quebec. To verify the linguistic hypothesis, we performed additional analyses 
in which we distinguish Francophones from non-Francophones in Quebec, New Brunswick, and 
the rest of Canada.13 
 
The results presented in Table 2 (Model I) indicate a “Francophone” effect in Quebec, where 
Francophones are more likely than residents of Ontario (our reference category) to support 
restrictions on minority religious symbols under all three scenarios.14 In contrast, non-
Francophones in Quebec are just as opposed as Ontarians to restrictions on police officers, and 
even more opposed than Ontarians to restrictions on teachers and students. The Francophone 
effect is also observed in New Brunswick, where Francophones express greater support for 
restrictions under all three scenarios.15 However, outside of Quebec and New Brunswick there are 
no significant linguistic differences. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
We performed a final set of analyses, in which we examined the effect of liberal values for 
Francophones and non-Francophones in Quebec and New Brunswick. Model II in Table 2 reports 
these findings; in it, we focus our attention on whether the interaction effect for liberal values is 
positive and significant for Francophones in Quebec and New Brunswick, and whether it helps to 
explain the gap between Francophones and non-Francophones in those two provinces. Among 
Francophones in Quebec, there is a positive and significant relationship between liberal values 
and support for restrictions on minority religious symbols for police officers and teachers. 
Moreover, the coefficients measuring the difference between Francophones in Quebec are 
substantially reduced and are no longer significant when the interaction variable is included. In 
none of the three scenarios is the interaction variable for liberal values significant for non-
Francophones in Quebec.  In the case of New Brunswick, we find little evidence that liberal 
values have an effect, either for Francophones or non-Francophones. Moreover, even though the 
coefficients measuring the difference between Francophones in New Brunswick and our 
reference category are no longer statistically significant once we include the interaction variable 
for liberal values, the coefficients barely shrink in size. Those findings confirm that there is 
something unique about the Quebec context when it comes to the relationship between liberal 
values and attitudes toward the presence of religious symbols in public institutions amongst 
Francophones.   
 
Conclusion 
The cleavage between Quebecers and other Canadians on restrictions on minority religious 
symbols is well documented. The roots of this cleavage, however, are more nebulous. In many 
European countries, where similar debates have polarized public opinion, out-group antipathy 
and low levels of religiosity have been found to influence attitudes toward the place of minority 
religions in public institutions (Helbling, 2014; Van der Noll and Saroglou, 2015). At first sight, 
these two explanations appear to apply well to Quebecers. Religiosity declined drastically after 
the Quiet Revolution and, as mentioned previously, a number of studies have observed a 
particular discomfort with ethnocultural diversity in Quebec. Our study acknowledges these 
assumptions and explores an alternative explanation, namely the relationship between core liberal 
values and attitudes towards restrictions on minority religious symbols varies across Quebec and 
the rest of Canada. One explanation for this is the contemporary predominance of distinctive 
interpretations of liberalism in Quebec and the rest of Canada. 
 
A number of scholars have argued that efforts to restrict the wearing of religious symbols in 
public institutions are to some degree motivated by a particular variant of liberalism. However, 
the few studies to empirically investigate whether liberal values have influenced public opinion 
on this matter have been inconclusive (Helbling 2014, Saroglou et al. 2009). Gustavsson et al. 
(2016) argue that those inconclusive results stem, in part, from a reliance on measures of liberal 
values that fail to distinguish between different interpretations of liberalism. Employing two 
unique sets of indicators to measure enlightenment and reformation liberalism in the Netherlands, 
they observe that the former is associated with support for restrictions on religious symbols, 
while the latter is associated with opposition (Ibid.).  
 
Like Gustavsson et al. (2016), we stress the significance of different interpretations of liberalism 
and their effects on attitudes toward minority religious symbols in different contexts. However, 
our study explored whether in two different settings a single, common measure of liberalism 
relates in diametrically opposite manners to support for restrictions on minority religious 
symbols. Our expectation was that the gap in support for minority religious symbols between the 
two societies would be accounted for not by different levels of values or attitudes such as 
prejudice, religiosity or even liberalism, but instead by a fundamentally different relationship 
between liberal values and support for restrictions on minority religious symbols in each society. 
Our investigation lends support to these hypotheses. A single and common indicator of liberal 
values is related in diametrically opposite ways to support for restrictions on minority religious 
symbols in Quebec and the rest of Canada. Whereas in Quebec, holding stronger liberal values is 
associated with greater support for restrictions on minority religious symbols, in the rest of 
Canada, stronger liberal values are associated with weaker support for such restrictions. We 
interpret these empirical findings as consistent with the view that two different interpretations of 
liberalism predominate in Quebec and the rest of Canada, and that these different interpretations 
of liberalism appear to explain the cleavage between Quebec and the rest of Canada when it 
comes to the place of minority religious symbols in the public sphere. That these findings vary 
according to whom is targeted by those restrictions also provides preliminary evidence that elite 
discourse might be driving this attitudinal faultline. A student ban on minority religious symbols 
was less embedded within elite discourse in Quebec than the equivalent ban for police officers 
and teachers. The absence of a relationship in Quebec between liberal values and a student ban 
on minority religious symbols offers important, albeit indirect, preliminary evidence that elite 
discourse plays a key role in Quebec. By way of contrast, in the rest of Canada, liberal values are 
consistently associated with opposition to restrictions on minority religious symbols, regardless 
of the target of those restrictions.   
 
Let us be clear. Xenophobia, feelings of cultural threat and religiosity undoubtedly structure 
public opinion on the presence of minority religious symbols in public institutions, both in 
Quebec and in the rest of Canada. However, these factors cannot account for the significant 
discrepancy between the policy preferences of mass publics of those two societies. The difference 
between Quebec and the rest of Canada appears instead to be a fundamental cultural difference, a 
tale of two liberalisms.  
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Appendix 1. Construction of Variables 
Religion is important in 
my life 
1=strongly agree; .67=agree; .33=disagree; 0=strongly disagree 
Immigration is a threat to 
culture of province 
1=Immigration is a threat to provincial culture.  
0=Immigration enriches provincial culture or has no impact on provincial culture. 
Feelings toward minority 
groups 
0-10 seven-item scale where 10 means strong feelings for the following ethnic and 
religious minority groups: Blacks, Latinos, Chinese, Indians, Filipinos, Jews and 
Muslims. 
Cronbach alpha = .93 
Distinctive feelings 
toward Muslims 
-10 to 10 scale where a positive score means more positive feelings toward Muslims 
than all minority groups and where a negative score means greater antipathy toward 
Muslims than all minority groups. 
Distinctive feelings 
toward Jews 
-10 to 10 scale where a positive score means more positive feelings toward Jews than 
all minority groups and where a negative score means greater antipathy toward Jews 
than all minority groups. 
Liberal values 0 to 10 scale made-up of five indicators where 10 means very liberal values and 0 
means very weak liberal values: 
Do you strongly, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements: 
1. Society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children. 
(reverse coding) 
2. It is too easy to get an abortion nowadays. (reverse coding) 
3. Gays and lesbians should NOT be allowed to marry in Canada. (reverse coding) 
4. Euthanasia (or assisted suicide) is never ethically justified. (reverse coding) 
5. Canada should decriminalize prostitution  
(Cronbach alpha = .68) 
 
Table 1. Explaining Quebecers’ Greater Support for Restrictions on Minority 
Religious Symbols 
 Police Officer on 
Duty (N=4971) 
 
Teacher in Public 
School (N=4968) 
 
Student in Public 
School (N=4972) 
 I II III  I II III  I II III 
Province  
(ref. = Ontario) 
           
Nfld & 
Labrador 
-.07 
(.18) 
.25 
(.20) 
.26 
(.20) 
 -.34 
(.21) 
-.06 
(.22) 
-.06 
(.23) 
 -.12 
(.22) 
.22 
(.25) 
.22 
(.25) 
PEI -.24 
(.23) 
-.09 
(.25) 
-.10 
(.26) 
 -.14 
(.26) 
.05 
(.27) 
.04 
(.28) 
 -.06 
(.27) 
.08 
(.32) 
.07 
(.32) 
Nova Scotia -.12 
(.14) 
.06 
(.17) 
.07 
(.17) 
 -.09 
(.15) 
.06 
(.18) 
.08 
(.18) 
 -.09 
(.17) 
.10 
(.19) 
.11 
(.19) 
New Brunswick .46b 
(.15) 
.64a 
(.16) 
.64a 
(.17) 
 .58a 
(.15) 
.77a 
(.17) 
.78a 
(.17) 
 .43b 
(.16) 
.60c 
(.18) 
.61b 
(.18) 
Manitoba -.09 
(.14) 
.02 
(.15) 
.02 
(.16) 
 -.35c 
(.15) 
-.31 
(.17) 
-.32 
(.18) 
 -.45b 
(.17) 
-.43c 
(.19) 
-.43c 
(.19) 
Saskatchewan .32c 
(.15) 
.25 
(.16) 
.23 
(.16) 
 .15 
(.15) 
.06 
(.17) 
.02 
(.17) 
 -.02 
(.17) 
-.20 
(.19) 
-.22 
(.19) 
Alberta .21 
(.11) 
.22 
(.13) 
.22 
(.13) 
 -.06 
(.12) 
-.11 
(.14) 
-.13 
(.14) 
 -.21 
(.14) 
-.30 
(.16) 
-.32c 
(.16) 
British 
Columbia 
-.21 
(.12) 
-.22 
(.13 
-.23 
(.13) 
 -.20 
(.13) 
-.20 
(.14) 
-.21 
(.15) 
 -.33c 
(.14) 
-.35c 
(.16) 
-.35c 
(.16) 
Quebec 1.18b 
(.12) 
1.23a 
(.14) 
-.30 
(.38) 
 1.15a 
(.12) 
1.15a 
(.14) 
-.46 
(.35) 
 .66a 
(.13) 
.57a 
(.14) 
-.16 
(.36) 
Religiosity  -.35c 
(.14) 
-.33c 
(.15) 
  -.58a 
(.15) 
-.57a 
(.15) 
  -.26 
(.16) 
-.26 
(.16) 
Feelings 
minority groups 
 -.20a 
(.02) 
-.21a 
(.02) 
  -.22a 
(.02) 
-.23a 
(.02) 
  -.26a 
(.03) 
-.26a 
(.03) 
Feelings – Jews  .03 
(.04) 
.03 
(.04) 
  -.01 
(.04) 
-.01 
(.04) 
  .02 
(.03) 
.02 
(.03) 
Feelings - 
Muslims 
 -.27a 
(.03) 
-.27a 
(.03) 
  -.29a 
(.03) 
-.29a 
(.03) 
  -.24a 
(.03) 
-.24a 
(.03) 
Immigration 
threat 
 1.01a 
(.11) 
1.02a 
(.11) 
  .69a 
(.11) 
.70a 
(.11) 
  .71a 
(.12) 
.72a 
(.12) 
Liberal Values  -.05c 
(.02) 
-.09a 
(.02) 
  -.04 
(.02) 
-.09b 
(.03) 
  -.08c 
(.03) 
-.10b 
(.03) 
Liberal Values 
x Quebec 
  .22a 
(.05) 
   .23a 
(.05) 
   .11c 
(.05) 
            
Constant -.20c 
(.08) 
1.06a 
(.27) 
1.32a 
(.28) 
 -.79a 
(.09) 
.59c 
(.28) 
.93b 
(.29) 
 -1.21 
(.10) 
.44 
(.30) 
.60 
(.32) 
Pseudo R2 .044 .189 .195 
 
.050 .189 .196 
 
.022 .168 .169 
Entries are binary logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Provincial Diversity Project a. p < .001; b. p < .01; c. p < .05 
 
Table 2. Language and Support for Restrictions on Minority Religious Symbols 
 Police Officer on Duty 
(N=4961) 
Teacher in Public 
School (N=4958) 
Student in Public 
School (N=4962) 
 I II I II I II 
Province (ref. = Ontario) 
      
Nfld & Labrador .25 
(.20) 
.26 
(.20) 
-.06 
(.22) 
-.06 
(.23) 
.21 
(.25) 
.22 
(.25) 
PEI -.11 
(.25) 
-.12 
(.25) 
.03 
(.27) 
.02 
(.28) 
.06 
(.31) 
.05 
(.31) 
Nova Scotia .05 
(.17) 
.06 
(.17) 
.06 
(.18) 
.07 
(.18) 
.09 
(.19) 
.10 
(.19) 
Manitoba .01 
(.15) 
.01 
(.16) 
-.33 
(.17) 
-.33 
(.17) 
-.44c 
(.19) 
-.44c 
(.19) 
Saskatchewan .26 
(.16) 
.25 
(.16) 
.06 
(.17) 
.04 
(.17) 
-.19 
(.19) 
-.20 
(.19) 
Alberta .21 
(.13) 
.21 
(.13) 
-.13 
(.14) 
-.15 
(.14) 
-.33c 
(.16) 
-.33c 
(.16) 
British Columbia -.22 
(.13) 
-.23 
(.13) 
-.21 
(.14) 
-.21 
(.15) 
-.35c 
(.16) 
-.36c 
(.16) 
Religiosity -.31c 
(.15) 
-.31c 
(.15) 
-.56a 
(.15) 
-.56a 
(.15) 
-.24 
(.16) 
-.24 
(.16) 
Feelings minority groups -.20a 
(.02) 
-.21a 
(.02) 
-.22a 
(.03) 
-.23a 
(.03) 
-.26a 
(.03) 
-.26a 
(.03) 
Feelings – Jews .05 
(.04) 
.05 
(.04) 
.02 
(.04) 
.02 
(.04) 
.04 
(.03) 
.04 
(.03) 
Feelings – Muslims -.26a 
(.03) 
-.26a 
(.03) 
-.28a 
(.03) 
-.27a 
(.03) 
-.23a 
(.03) 
-.23a 
(.03) 
Immigration is cultural threat .98a 
(.11) 
1.00a 
(.11) 
.65a 
(.11) 
.66a 
(.11) 
.68a 
(.12) 
.69a 
(.12) 
Francophones .26 
(.26) 
.27 
(.26) 
.33 
(.27) 
.33 
(.27) 
.25 
(.29) 
.25 
(.29) 
Francophones Quebec 1.47a 
(.28) 
-.34 
(.51) 
1.34a 
(.28) 
-.18 
(.48) 
.61c 
(.30) 
-.01 
(.47) 
Non-Francophones Quebec -.03 
(.22) 
-.54 
(.64) 
-.78b 
(.28) 
-1.49c 
(.71) 
-.85c 
(.34) 
-.65 
(.68) 
Francophones NB .93b 
(.32) 
.59 
(.70) 
1.10b 
(.33) 
.79 
(.70) 
.75c 
(.35) 
.13 
(.64) 
Non-Francophones NB .39c 
(.20) 
.58 
(.45) 
.47c 
(.20) 
1.04c 
(.45) 
.41 
(.21) 
1.22b 
(.45) 
Liberal Values -.06b 
(.02) 
-.09a 
(.02) 
-.06c 
(.02) 
-.09b 
(.03) 
-.08b 
(.03) 
-.10b 
(.03) 
Lib. values Franco. in QC  .25a 
(.06) 
 .21a 
(.05) 
 .09 
(.05) 
Lib. values non-Franco. in QC  .08 
(.09) 
 .11 
(.09) 
 -.04 
(.10) 
Lib. values Franco. in NB  .05 
(.09) 
 .05 
(.09) 
 .10 
(.08) 
Lib. values non-Franco. in NB  -.03 
(.07) 
 -.09 
(.07) 
 -.14 
(.07) 
Constant 1.11a 
(.27) 
1.31a 
(.28) 
.68c 
(.28) 
.90a 
(.30) 
.49 
(.31) 
.58 
(.32) 
Pseudo R2 .206 .211 .218 .222 .181 .182 
Entries are binary logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Provincial Diversity Project      a. p < .001; b. p < .01; c. p < .05 
Figure 1. Support for Restrictions on Minority Religious Symbols by Liberal Values, 
Quebec and the Rest of Canada (Predicted Probabilities) 
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1 For an overview of discourses around the Charter, see Lamy (2015). A growing body of literature has 
explored the attitudes of Quebecers toward religious minority symbols (O’Neill et al., 2015; Ferland, 
2018) or the Charter of Quebec Values (Tessier and Montigny, 2016; Bilodeau et al., 2018; Ferland, 
2018). Other studies have also explored attitudes toward religious accommodation (Wright et al., 2016; 
Dufresne et al. 2018). However, none have systematically explored the impact of holding liberal values, 
although O’Neill et al. (2015) show the determinant role played by feminist arguments. Moreover, in a 
study of the sources of support for the Quebec Charter of Values (Bilodeau et al., 2018), we found that 
supporters of both the Charter and the removal of the crucifix from the National Assembly of Quebec 
were more liberal than those who opposed the Charter. In this paper, we explore whether holding liberal 
values has distinct attitudinal consequences inside and outside Quebec.  
2 As Carmines and D’Amico (2015) note in their recent review of the literature, although 
earlier scholarship questioned whether ideological thinking structures mass public opinion, much 
contemporary work on ideology and public opinion has shifted away from a “traditional conception of 
ideology” - with an emphasis on opinion constraint and coherence - to a focus on the roles of core values 
and principles in structuring attitudes and action. Our focus on liberal values is consistent with this latter 
conception of ideology.     
3 A Gallup poll conducted in April 1990 found that 75% of Canadians opposed allowing RCMP officers to 
wear religious headwear. Opposition was the highest not in Quebec, but in the Prairie provinces. See 
Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (1990).  
4 The Stasi commission was appointed to explore the application of the principle of laïcité in the French 
Republic. One of its main recommendations was to restrict the wearing of religious symbols in schools, 
which led to the adoption of the Loi sur les signes religieux dans les écoles publiques françaises. More 
broadly, the Commission report stated that “the rise of new religious practices requires a renewed 
application of the laïcité principle.” (Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans 
la République, 2003 : 50, our translation).  
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5 The survey provides samples of 1000 respondents for each of Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British 
Columbia and samples of 500 respondents for other provinces, except for PEI and Newfoundland and 
Labrador, for which the combined sample is 400 respondents. The fieldwork was conducted by Léger 
Marketing. All the data from the survey, the Provincial Diversity Project, will be publicly available in the 
summer of 2019 through the Canadian Opinion Research Archive.  
6 See Appendix 1 for more information on the construction of variables. 
7 We also asked respondents whether immigration was a threat to the Canadian culture. We use the 
indicator about threat to the province instead of threat to Canada because it is more salient for Quebecers 
and because both indicators are equally salient for other Canadians; 29% of Quebecers and 28% of other 
Canadians say that immigration threatens Canadian culture. 
8 Additional analyses were also performed in which we included a variable indicating whether respondents 
were PQ supporters. This allowed us to verify whether or not including this variable in Model 1 explain 
the Quebec-Rest of Canada gap in support for restrictions on minority religious symbols. The results 
indicate that although PQ supporters are indeed more likely to supporter restrictions for minority religious 
symbols, including such a variable does not explain the greater support for restrictions on minority 
religious symbols observed among Quebecers and it does not explain the unique and positive relationship 
between liberal values and support for restrictions on minority religious symbols observed for Quebec 
(results not presented).  
9 Reported differences are based on predicted probabilities derived from Model I. 
10 A related question is whether those with liberal values in the Quebec context also want to restrict the 
display of Christian/majority symbols. Quebec respondents were asked whether they strongly agree, agree, 
disagree or strongly disagree that the crucifix should be removed from the National Assembly. In order to 
verify this possibility, we examined the relationship between liberal values and support for removing the 
crucifix at the National Assembly. These additional analyses indicate that those with stronger liberal 
values in Quebec express greater support for removing the crucifix from the National Assembly (results 
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not presented). Such findings are thus consistent with our argument that in Quebec, demands for 
restrictions on minority religious symbols are not simply motivated by prejudices or xenophobia. 
Unfortunately, no equivalent analyses can be performed in the rest of Canada because our data do not 
include any question on Christian/majority symbols for outside of Quebec respondents. 
11 The interaction variable between Quebec and liberal values is statistically significant and positive even 
when other control variables are not included in the model (results not presented). Moreover, we also 
verified whether the positive relationship between liberal attitudes and support for restrictions on minority 
religious symbols was limited to PQ supporters only (and therefore might not extend to the entire Quebec 
population). To do so, we included in the model another interaction variable between PQ supporters and 
liberal values. These additional analyses indicate that the interaction variable PQ supporter-liberal values 
is not significant for any of the three different situation of restriction and that including this variable in the 
model does not impact on the other interaction variable Quebec-liberal attitudes. Results not presented. 
12 Analyses were conducted including age, gender, education, and belonging to a non-Christian religion. 
Including these variables does not alter the findings reported in Table 1. We did not include these 
variables in Table 1 because Quebec and the rest of Canada present a profile broadly comparable on these 
characteristics. Results not presented. 
13 We do not investigate Francophones in specific provinces other than Quebec and New Brunswick 
because their sample is too small. We use language spoken at home as it is more representative of the 
language used by respondents than mother tongue. 
14 In the case of students at a public school, the p-value for difference for Francophones in Quebec is equal 
to .056. 
15 Non-Francophones in New Brunswick also appear more supportive of restrictions in all three scenarios, 
but for students the difference is only statistically significant at the .10-level. 
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